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PROBLEMS IN PARTNERSHIP
The Pennsylvania cases on partnership present some
curious situations. As a learned author observes, "The
life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience." 1
Our cases involving the holding of property by
partners are by no means logical but represent the experience of our courts in an endeavor to reconcile and
sometimes apply divergent and diametrically opposite
theories. The law of partnership has suffered in its
development from the antagonistic views of the law and
the equity courts and as we in Pennsylvania have had a
peculiar amalgamation of legal and equitable conceptions, 2 it is not strange that our courts would oftimes be
in confusion, sometimes adopting one concept and
sometimes another. The contract of partnership embracing, as it does, the dedication of property to a particular commercial use and involving furthermore of necessity accounting with the usual complications of that branch
of commerce, was early taken jurisdiction of by the
courts of equity. On the other hand affairs of partners
very often came within the jurisdiction of the courts
of law particularly through the actions of creditors of the
partners issuing executions and the questions arising in
1
The
2

Common Law by Holmes, now Mr. Justice Holmes, page 1.
Rawle, Essay Eq. in Penna.; Laussat, Id.; Fisher: Eq. in
Penna; rzma-ks of Cibson, C. J., Torr's Estate, 2 Rvle, 253.
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the matter of sales of partnership property and the distribution of proceeds. When A, B, and C, enter into the
relation of partnership, contributions are made by
them to the purpose of the joint venture, e. g., each contributes say $4,000. The total amount thus contributed
constitutes what is called the capital stock or the assets of
the partnership. This amount is invested in a way to
carry out the purpose of the joint venture. In the conduct of the business and in the relations of the partners
collectively and individually with the business world, it
is conceivable that obligations will he incurred. Obligations that are incurred in the joint venture are called firm
or partnership debts or obligations. Other obligations or
debts may, however, be incurred by the partners as individuals aside from and not related to the joint venture.
All the obligations or debts are, nevertheless, obviously
against the partners themselves. Most of the difficulties and incongruities in our Pennsylvania law of partnership have grown out of determinations as to the rights
of firm and separate creditors and the root of the trouble
has been the divergent views as to the nature of a partnership and the rights or so-called "equities" of the partners.

Is the Firm an Entity?In the study of this problem, as well as allied or
kindred ones, the reader cannot escape, the prevailing,
yea, pernicious influence of Doner v Stauffer, 8 erroneous as the reasoning may be, 4 this celebrated
case has persisted as a guide in partnership problems
in this state for over three-quarters of a century due to
the fetish like worship accorded its great author by the
legal profession and the almost saintlike halo surrounding his memory.
Says Gibson, C. J., 1 "It is settled by a train of decisions in the American, as well as the British
81 P. & W. 203 (1829.)
4Dickinson Forum, Vol. 10 page 25.
• 5Doner v Stauffer, supra.
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Courts, that the joint effects belong to the firm and
not to the partners." That is to say the legal title
of the partnership assets is not in the individual partners
but is vested in a quasi corporate body called the firm.
Logically, it would appear, that the learned justice starting his argument with the premise that the joint effects
belonged to the firm and not to the partners, ought to have
reached the conclusion that no action of a separate creditor of a member of the firm could effect the firm's title
to the assets levied upon, and yet the opposite conclusion
was attained and the joint assets swept away because
the interests of both partners were sold at the same sale,
fVo the same purchaser. With the entity theory as a premise, the New York Court in Menagh v Whitwell -6
decided that even though every partner's interest in the
partnership was sold by executions of separate creditors,
or otherwise disposed of, nevertheless, these sales did not
effect the legal title of the corpus of the partnership
estate which was vested in the firm. Although Gibson,
C. J., did not consistently or persistently apply his entity
theory we find numerous allusions in the cases citing
Doner v Stauffer for the proposition that the firm is
Vie legal owner of the partnership assets. In Clarke
v Railroad Company, 7 a comparatively recent case,
Mr. Justice Williams declared unequivocally that the
partnership when formed is "a distinct person in law,"
owning its property, having a right to contract and to sue
and be sued by its firm name. 8
Although this view has been advanced in matters of accomiting in equity, it has never received the sanction
of the common law. Says Holmes, .J,in Francis & McNeal; 8 "Since Cory on Accounts was made more famous
by Lindley on Partnership, the notion that the firm is
652 N. Y. 146 (1873.)
7136 Pa. 413 (1890.)
xTo same effect, Gordon, C. J. Richard v Allen Pa. 199
(1887.)
.
9298 U. S. 695 (1913).
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an entity distinct from its members has grown in popularity, and the notion has been confirmed by recent
speculations as to the nature of corporations and the oneness of any somewhat permanently combined group without the aid of law. But the fact remains as true as ever
that partnership debts are debts of the members of the
firm and that the individual liability of the members
is not collateral like that of a surety but primary and
direct , whatever priorities there may be in the
marshaling of assets." 10 However, Gibson C. J., could
not have meant what he said despite the fact that his
dictum has been taken seriously by later courts, for in
Moddewell v Keever, - he admitted that the notion
of firm ownership was merely a figment of the equity
courts raised for the purpose of carrying out the
evident, contract of partnership that the firm assets
should be devoted to firm uses, adding rather significantly, "the common law courts act on the same principle,
though it is not so easy for them to carry it out."
It is reasonably clear as a fact that the title to the
property of a partnership, real or personal, can only be
vested, according to common law theory, in the individuals who compose the group called the firm. The partnership as an entity or quasi-corporate-body is not a legal
concept hua and legally speaking it would be just as
efficacious to attempt to vest a legal title at common law
in the town pump or in a cemetery lot as to select a nonrecognizable, non-existing being called by merchants a
firm. 12
The Uniform Partnership Act repudiates the Gibson
dictum in Section 6, thus defining a partnership:
10

See also Hughes v Gross, 166 Mass. 61 (1896).

118 W. & S. 63 (1844)t

Ila. It might be desirable, however, to abandon the legal

theory. For a strong expression of the entity theory, see remarks
Jessel,2 M. R., in English case, Pooley v Driver, 8 H. L. C. 268 (1876).
i We have a curious instance of attempted personification in

Orphans' Court Practice when dealing with "decedents' estates."
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"A partnership is an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."'I s

Are Partners Joint Tenants?
As early as 1693 it was said in the English Courts that
partners were joint tenants and in consequence Holt, C. J.,
held that upon an execution against a partner by his
separate creditor the sheriff in executing a writ against
the partner's share in the partnership, must seize the
entire partnership property, "because the moieties are
undivided: for if he seize but a moiety and sell that, the
others will have a right to a moiety of that moiety;
but he must seize the whole and sell a moiety
thereof undivided and the vendee will be tenant
in common with the other partner." 14
This
was an expression of the common law view of the relation of partners and was later acquiesced in by the
equity courts, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in West v
Skip 15 declaring "the partners themselves are clearly
joint tenants in the stock and all effects being seized per
my and per tout," adding, however, that the partners were
entitled to an accounting in equity as against each other. 6
The equity courts in order to preserve the elements
of the partnership agreement and the priority of claims
against the partnership entertained bills of injunction
restraining sheriffs thus levying from selling until an
accounting had been stated.
In Moddewell v Keever, 17 Gibson, C. J., refers to
this practice and the resultant effect in this language:
"A partner himself has no more. than a resulting
interest in the stock, to be ascertained by a settlement of
the partnership account, and he can transfer no more. So
far is the principle carried in equity that solvent partners
1 Act Mch. 26, 1915, P. L. 18. See also Mch. number 1916.
Dickinson Law Review. "Any estate in real property may be acquired4 in the partnership name." Uniform Act, Sec. 8 (3).

1lSalkeld, 392 (1693).
151 Vesey, 239 (1749).
8

Heydon v Heydon.

' Taylor v Fields, 4 Vesey 396.

178 W. & S. 63 (1844).
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are entitled to an injunction to stay execution of the joint
effects, for a separate debt, till the accounts are taken:
and if it turn out that the debtor has nothing in the stock,
the injunction will be made perpetual, as it was in Taylor
v Fields, (4 Vesey 396) and Barker v Goodair, (11 Vesey
85), and the common law courts act on the same principle,
though it is not so easy for them to carry it out. It seems
to be settled that a purchaser of an interest in the joint
effects under a separate execution, is a tenant in common
with the other partners, and subject to their equities
against the partner whose interest he has acquired."
With these authorities in mind Hepburn, P. J., for the
lowei court in King's Appeal, 18 nineteen years after
Doner v Stauffer was moved to say: "The creditor of any one partner may take in execution
that partner's interest in all the tangible property
of the partnership, and may sell the undivided interest of
his debtor. The purchaser becomes a tenant in common
with the other partner and takes the property in the same
manner as the debtor himself had it, subject to the
partnership debts and to the rights of the other partner."
In a Per Curiam, the judgment of the court below was
affirmed "on the lucid and accurate opinion" submitted.
Five years later in Deal v Bogue, 19 the Supreme Court
more moved apparently by the equity view of the matter
decided that the partners altho holding as joint tenants
did not have such interest as could be directly reached by
their separate creditors, hence the sheriff levying on the
partnership property for the separate debt of a partner
was guilty of trespass. "A levy, then, to effect the interest of a partner, cannot touch a specific portion of the
189 Pa. 126 (1848).
1920 Pa. 228 (1853) per Woodward, L. The early cases permitted a seizure of specific items subject to an accounting. The later
cases deny the right of tangible seizure. The levy should be on
the partner's interest in the partnership, not his interest in specific
property. This is the construction despite the peculiar wording
of the Act of 1873. See McCrossin v McCrossin, 21 Pa., C. C. 36
1899. Dengler's Appeal, 125 Pa. 18 (1889). Balliet v Stever 6

Northampton, 197 (1897).
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goods, nor the whole, because others have property in
every part, as well as the whole, coupled with a right
resting in contract, to use them for the purpose for
which the partnership was instituted." It is remarkable
that the court here reached a conclusion forbidding a
seizure upon precisely the same line of reasoning adopted
by Holt, C. J., 20 almost two centuries before to reach the
very opposite result. However, Holt, C. J., made no mention of the "right, resting in contract," an equitable creation of probably a later date. In Vandike v Rosskam, 21 the
lower court, influenced by the earlier decisions, remarked
that altho only the interest of the partner could be sold,
the sheriff might seize the corpus of the partnership
property to accomplish this result. This was held to be
error, the court repeating the reasoning of Deal v Bogue.
It is now well established that the sheriff cannot at the
instance of a separate creditor's writ disturb the possession of the remaining partners. 22 The development
and evolution of our law along these lines is the direct
result of the legal recognition of the partner's equity
doctrine, an equitable concept, together with the influence of the entity theory as it was gradually being recognized by our judges. This is also apparent from the construction given the provisions of the Special Fi. Fa. Act
of April 8, 1873. 23 With the repudiation of the
dogma that the sheriff, for a separate creditor, could seize
the corpus of the partnership estate, there would apparently pass out also the conclusion that the purchaser of a
partner's interest becomes a tenant in common with the
remaining partner. What becomes of the doctrine of
joint tenancy of the partners?
2OHeydon v Heydon, supra, 14.

2167 Pa. 330 (1871), per Williams, J. It will be recalled that
this justice was a strong advocate of the entity theory. Durborrow's
Appeal, 84 Pa. 404 (1877) per Paxson, J.
22
Richard v Allen, 117 Pa. 199 (1887).
2SThis act has been repealed by Section 45, Uniform Partnership Act.

98
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The Uniform Partnership Act, which as has already
been quoted repudiates the entity theory and distinctly
designates the partners as co-owners, 24 presents a
solution of the problem -by creating a new tenure called
"tenancy in partnership." The provisions are as follows:
"Section 24. The property rights of a partner
are (1) his rights in specific partnership property; (2) his interest in the partnership, and
(3) his right to participate in the management.
Section 25. (1) A partner is co-owner with his
partner of. specific partnership property, holding as a tenant in partnership; (2) the incidents
of his tenancy are such that: (a) A partner,
subject to the provisions of this act and any
agreement between the partners, has an equal
right with his partners to possess specific
partnership property for partnership purposes:
but he has no right to possess such property for
any other purpose without the consent of his
partners. (b) A partner's right in specific
partnership property is not assignable, except
in connection with the assignment of the rights
of all partners in the same property. (c) A
partner's right in specific partnership .property
is not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim against the partnership. When
partnership property is attached for partnership debt, the partners, or one of them, or the
representative of a deceased partner, cannot
claim any right under the homestead or exemption laws. (d) On the death of a partner his
right in specific partnership property vests in
the surviving partner or partners, except when
the deceased was the last surviving partner,
when his right in such property vests in his legal
representative. Such surviving partner or
24
Prof. Beale in his edition of Parsons on Part. defines a
partnership as "a legal entity formed by the association of two
or more persons for the purpose of carrying on business, etc."
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partners, or the legal representative of the
last surviving partner, has no right to possess
the partnership property for any but a partnership purpose. (2) A partner's right in specific
partnership property is not subject to dower,
curtesy or allowances to widows, heirs, or next
of kin."
These provisions, together with Section 26 to be
hereinafter quoted, constitute what might properly be
termed the heart of the Uniform Act. The application of
these provisions will be discussed in connection with the
following additional problem of this article.

What Is the Partner's Equity?
In the formation of the association of partnership,
the equity courts have drawn from the contract an implied understanding from the nature of the agreement
that the contributions of the various members to the
enterprise and called after the analogy to corporations,
the capital stock, shall be dedicated to the purpose of the
joint venture and shall be used exclusively to that end.
Such implication gives rise to what is called "the
partners' equity."
Sharswood, J.thus expressed it, 25 "The interest
of each partner in the assets of the firm is not
a title to any aliquot part, as a half or a fourth.
Each partner being liable in solido for the engagements of the partnership has a right, which is
termed his equity, because in England it was administered only in the Courts of Chancery, to have the firm
assets applied in the first instance to the payment of the
firm debts-an equity through the instrumentality of
which the partnership creditors have a priority over
separate creditors to be paid out of the partnership funds.
The interest of a partner is therefore only such a proportion of the capital and profits as by the original articles
25

Manmattan Insurance Co. v Webster, 59 Pa. 227 (1868).
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of agreement he may appear to be entitled to receive
after all the debts are paid, and the affairs of the concern liquidated and wound up." 26 Gibson, C. J., in
Doner v Stauffer, referring'to this phase of the partnership contract as a means by which partners may keep a
class of their creditors "at-bay" marvels that it should not
have been deemed within the statute of Elizabeth and
states that it was not, "is attributed exclusively to the disposition universally manifested by courts of justice to encourage trade," and continuing says: "But such as
it is, has the contract of partnership been established:
and the principle-which enables the partners to pledge
to each other the joint effects as a fund for
the payment of joint debts has introduced a preference in favor of the joint creditor, founded on no
merits of their own but on the equity which springs from
the nature of the contract between the partners themselves." 27
In the preceding sentence of the opinion just quoted
the learned justice had laid down the doctrine that
'the joint effects belong to the firm, and not to the
partners." To a neophyte the wonder grows at 'the
polarity of mind" which would in two succeeding
sentences express such diametrically opposite ideas, 2S
thus deserting the entity theory and embracing the common law notion with no warning whatsoever to 'the
gentle reader."
However, an unbroken line of authority in Pennsylvania, beginning with Doner v Stauffer, teaches the
doctrine that the right of the partnership creditors to
a priority in firm assets is not an inherent one but is
derivative from the respective rights of the partners
against each other. Referring to the rights of partnership
creditors in Baker's
Appeal, 29 Lewis, J., says:
26Mechem on Part. 2nd. Ed. 371; L Lind, Part. (Ewells) 352.
271 P. & W. 203 (1829).
. 2 8Menagh v Whitwell, supra note 6.
2921 Pa. 82 (1853).
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"The latter have no lien on the- property and must
work out thleir preference in the distribution of the
partnership funds, entirely through the medium of the
partners whose interests remain undisposed of. Story's
Equity, Sec. 8, 1253." The equity or right of the partners
may be waived by them 80 and it is held to be waived when
a partner's interest is sold either by himself or by the
sheriff at the instance of a separate creditor. *Says
Lewis, J., in Coover's Appeal, 31 each partner has such
right or equity "while he exercises dominion over the
property, to insist on its application to partnership claims,
before it be appropriated to individual debts of the
several partners. But this right may be waived and it is
waived when each partner disposes of all his interest in
the property. Sales on separate executions against the
several partners have the same effkct as sales by the individual partners themselves, Doner v Stauffer, 1 P. & W.
205: Baker's Appeal, 9 Harris, 16."
In McNutt v Strayhorn & Hobson, 82 Thompson
J., speaks of the sale of the partner's interest "destroying" his dominion or control over the firm assets and
thus working a destruction of the equity.
It is not, however, the mere levy upon the interest
which destroys the dominion or control and the resultant
annihilation of the equity. There must be a sale to mark
the passage of the control. Hence when separate creditors of each partner make a levy upon the interest,
which it will be recalled, is the uncertain and indefinite
result of a partnership accounting, but before the sale
under these levies a partnership creditor intervenes with
an execution, the latter prevails. The joint levy is made
upon the corpus or tangible property of the partnership,
the separate levies are merely upon the residual interests. 88 As the priority of creditors is based upon the
8OEx parte Ruffin, 6 Vesey, 191, Baker's Appeal, supra.
8129 Pa. 14 (1857).
8239 Pa. 273 (1861).
88 King's Appeal, 9 Pa. 124. (1848); Cooper's Appeal, 26 Pa.

262 (1856).
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equity of the partners and the equity of the partners in
turn upon the contract of partnership, it has been held
that joint creditors, who are not however, partnership
creditors, can not claim the benefit of the equity. They
are not children of the covenant or heirs of the promise.3 4

Doner v Stauffer."
A and B were partners in trade. X, a separate creditor of A, levied, upon the latter's interest and later Y,
a separate creditor of B, levied upon B's interest. The
two writs were in the sheriff's hands at the same
time and by virtue of these two writs the personal property of the firm was sold at one sale to the same purchaser. The lower court distributed the proceeds of the
sale equally to X and Y. and denied the right of partnership creditors, who had not issued executions, to any
participation in the proceeds, and refused the admission
of any evidence that the firm was insolvent, because
"this is a case where the whole partnership effects are
swept away by separate executions against each partner,
when the creditors at large have no lien."
The Supreme Court per Gibson, C. J., affirmed the
judgment declaring inter alia, "when the shares of the
partners are united in the same purchaser every
semblance of partnership equities is at an end." The logic
of the learned justice may be tested by the following paraphrase of points consecutively taken in the opinion.
(1) -The joint assets belong to the firm and not
to the partners.
(2) -The interest of each partner is residual,
consisting of his portion of surplus remaining
after an accounting.
(3)-A separate creditor levies upon and sells
merely the interest specified in the last paragraph.
34Snodgrass' Appeal, 13 Pa. 474, (1850). See also Overholt's
Appeal, 12 Pa. 222 (1849). Hershey v Fulmer, 3 Pa. C. C. 442
(1887).
35

P. & W.

203, (1829).
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(4)-A sale of both interests simultaneously to
the same purchaser equals a joint sale of the
corpus.
(5)-Consecutive purchasers at the same sale
take the goods. Same result as in the preceding
paragraph.
Says Brown, P. J., in Richard v Allen, $1 "However
illogical it may appear that a purchaser of two
or more intangible interests in property should
thereby become the owner of the corpus of the property,
such is the well settled law of Pennsylvania as applied
to the purchase, by the same person, of the interests of
all the partners in the partnership property." The same
reasoning is applied when at the same sale, both interests
are sold to different purchasers." 87
The assumption
by Gibson, C. J.," in Doner v Stauffer, that the
sale of a partner's interest wrought destruction of
his equity, an assumption that is faithfully followed
in all subsequent cases, 38 was purely gratuitous and in
large measure unwarranted but in the light of the
development of partnership law in this state is explicable.
The court was undoubtedly confused as to the nature of
a partnership, whether to follow the entity or common law
theory. Furthermore the doctrine of Ex parte Ruffin 89
a case of voluntary transfer by partners, was improperly extended to involuntary dispositions.
Again
the court was perhaps unconsciously influenced by the
then well established practice, due to Holt C. J.'s holding that partners were joint tenants, that the tangible
property of the partnership could be seized, altho subject
to an accounting, a doctrine which as has already been
86117 Pa. 201 (1887).
37
Kely's Appeal, 16 Pa. 59 (1851); Vandike's Appeal, 17 Pa.
271 (1851);
Viandike's Appeal, 57 Pa. 9 (1868).
8
8Contra, Sharswood, P. J., Brenton v Thompson, L. 1. 133.
See also Woodward, J., Beatty's Appeal, 3 Grant, 213 (1857).

Vesey, 126.
4896
ODiscussion

under Joint-Tenancy, supra.
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pointed out has been abandoned by our later cases. 40
Nevertheless, it is amazing that a legal opinion as replete in grotesque reasoning as that of the eminent and
learned Chief Justice should have persisted and manifested such virility throughout the years. Verily
it is a striking illustration of the potency of a good name.

The Uniform Act.
It has been pointed out already in this article that the
Act is ostensibly and admittedly based upon the common
law theory of a partnership and that the partners are
"co-owners of the business." Furthermore, that the Act
creates a new kind of tenancy called "tenancy in partnership," the incidents of which are found in Section 25.
Section 26 must now be quoted to round out the discussion. It is as follows: "A partner's interest in the
partnership is his share of the profits and surplus, and
the same is personal property."
In Doner v Stauffer, Gibson, C. J., in referring to
the partner's interest said: "In consequence of the
rule as I have stated it, a separate creditor
of the partnership, but
sells, not the chattels
the interest of the partner, encumbered with the joint
debts." The year before in Taylor v Henderson, 41
the same judge declared that a partner "has no
specific interest in the partnership effects, but only in
what may remain after the settlement of the partnership
account," and in Moddewell v Keever, 42 he expresses
the same thought defining the interest as "a resulting
interest in the stock, to be ascertained by settlement of
the partnership account." This view has the approval of
all the subsequent cases. 48 Said Gordon, C. J., in
4117 S.
428 W.

& R. 456 (1828).

& S. 63 (1844).
8Vandike v Rosskam, 67 Pa. 330, (1871); Appeal, 81%
Pa. 270 (1875); Richard v Allen, 117 Pa. 199 (1887); Clarke v R.
R. Co., 136 Pa. 418 (1890); Cf. Remarks Sharswood, T., Whigham's Appeal, 63 Pa. 198 (1869).
4
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Richard v Allen. " "Admittedly had the sale been on but
one of the writs, the purchaser would have taken no right
in the firm assets, but only the right to compel an account
with the continuing partner, and such also is the purport
of the first section of the Act of the 8th of April, 1873."
It follows that Section 26 of the Uniform Act is
in accord and harmony with the conception of our
courts as to the nature of a partner's interest as that conception has been gradually developed.
It is reasonably clear likewise that the incidents of
the "tenancy in partnership," expressed in Section 25,
are in harmony with the best and latest expressions of
our courts as to the effect of partners holding of the
specific partnership property, 45 except possibly in
those peculiar cases of real estate holdings illustrated
by Foster's Appeal, 46 Leaf's Appeal, 47 and Haeberly's
Appeal. 48

Partners'sEquities and the Uniform Act
The concluding problem to be discussed is the relation of the partner's equity with the terms of the Uniform Act. We have seen that the doctrine of the equities, originally an equitable idea has been absorbed by the
courts of law. That by virtue of these equities the partners
are enabled to keep "at bay" one class of creditors and
give to another class (the partnership creditors) a
preference in the distribution of the joint assets. That
furthermore this preference is not an original or inherent right of the firm creditors but is merely a derivative one from the rights of the partners themselves. That
the partners may, without being chargeable with fraud,
forego or waive these rights of each other and lastly, according to an unbroken line of authority from Doner
"117 Pa. 199 (1887) Cf. Smith v Emerson, 43 Pa. 456, (1862).
45Hall's Estate, 266 Pa. 312 (1920).
4674 Pa. 391 (1873).
47105 Pa. 505 (1884).
48191 Pa. 239 (1899); Real estate cases will be discussed in
a subsequent article.
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v Stauffer to the time of the passage of the Uniform Act,
our courts have held uniformly that a partner loses this
right upon the sale by the sheriff of his interest in the
partnership and that if all interests are sold, particularly
at the same sale, the legal effect is to sweep away comDoes the Uniform Act
pletely the partnership assets.
meet this admittedly anomalous state of our law, referred to as peculiar and provincial by every American
writer on the law of partnership? The basis of the
reasoning of our cases relative to the destruction of the
equity is that, by the sale, the partner has lost control
or dominion over the property of the partnership. In
Section 24 of the Act one of the tabulated property
rights of the partners is "his right to participate in the
ianagement."
Suppose A and B are partners and X, separate
creditor of A, levies upon A's interest in the partnership,
which would be under all authority that which is described in Section 26. The interest is sold to X. Does
A thereby lose his right of management? Has he lost
his dominion over the property as is held in all the cases
prior to the Act? 48a
Suppose, furthermore, that X obtains a judgment
later against B and levies upon and sells B's interest in
the partnership. Who then is the owner of the firm assets? Assuming that A. and B. were still considered
as the holders of the bare legal title to the property of
a partnership now dissolved, , 49 for whom would they
hold the property, for the partnership creditors and
ultimately for X, or merely for X, excluding the creditors
of the firm? As we have already seen by the terms of
the Act the partners are "co-owners" of the business. As
co-owners it is apparent upon both principle and authority in Pennsylvania, the partners may agree upon a disposition of the firm assets ousting the firm creditors of
their priority and the latter would have no legal re48aHorton's
49

Appeal, 13 Pa. 69 (1850).
See Uniform Act, Section 27, (1); Section 32, (2).
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course when their claims had not fastened on the
property as legal liens. The provisions of the Act are
to the same effect. ro
Section 38, (1), provides that each partner, as
against his co-partner and all persons claiming through
them in respect of their interest in the partnership may,
unless otherwise agreed, insist upon the applfcation of
the partnership property to the discharge of its liabilities, but it is not clear that partners who have parted with
their interests may likewise insist.
Under the terms of the Act the priority of firm
creditors must be based upon the equities of the partners
for the equities or rights of the partners-an equitable
concept as already shown-is nevertheless manifestly
based upon the common law view of the partnership,
recognized by the Act. If the entity view were considered,
there would be no place for the operation of the partner's
equity. The joint effects belong, then, as Gibson, C. J.,
has declared to "the firm" and creditors of the firm
have the same right to a liquidation of their claims first
out of firm assets that the creditors of a corporation
have against the assets of the corporate body. 51 If
the partners lose control or dominion by a disposition of
their interests and also by virtue of such loss the equity
to insist upon payment first of partnership creditors, the
latter's claim would be gone. The Act nowhere saves
the rights of partnership creditors because they are
firm creditors. If the rights of firm creditors are swept
away and the interests of the partners "in the partnership" are all sold, it will appear that merely a bare legal
title would stand between the purchaser X and the specific partnership property.
It is conceivable that our
courts in such case adhering to the doctrine of former
decisions would continue to follow Doner v Stauffer.
There is nothing in the Act to forbid this conclusion.
5

OSections 25, (2)-a; 38, (1);"40.

51

Woodward, J., in Deal v Bogue, 20 Pa. 228, (1853) uses the
corporate analogy for a somewhat similar illustration.
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Moreover, stare decisis is a legal maxim to conjure with
in Pennsylvania. Even as independent a thinker as
Sharswood, J., confessed in a rather astonishing way to
its constraining influence in another phase of partnersThp law when he said: "We are bound to stand super
antiquas vias, by our own decided cases; for nothing is
truer (?) or more important (!!?), than the maxim:
Omnis innovatio plus novitate perturbat, quam utilitate
prodest." 52
On the other hand our Courts may decide that as
X, in each instance purchased simply a right to an
accounting, the legal title to the firm property remaining in the partners, the recourse of X is to file a bill
against the partners for an accounting and in this proceeding the rights of firm creditors would be preserved.
In so doing they would undoubtedly be in harmony with
the current of authority and in accord with uniformity
which is the purpose of the Act and the avowed purpose
of the codification movement. To accomplish this however, Doner v Stauffer must be repudiated. Heretofore
this cause celebre, like Hamlet's ghost, has refused to
rest. Will it return to haunt us in the Uniform Act?
There is no authority at present. A thoughtful
writer, however, -referring to the possible disposition of
B's interest in the above queries says: "If his interest also
were finally seized by his separate creditor, the firm
title would not thereby be necessarily divested, nor his
right to continue the settlement necessarily be terminated, altho as a practical matter such a situation would
be likely to lead to bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings
against the partnership." 5
However, in discussing at a different point the appropriate sections, the same author sententiously
observes: 'It is obvious that these provisions raise some
5 2Edwards v Tracy, 62 Pa. 381 (1869). The bulwark of conservatism, the very ark of the covenant.
58Mechem, Elements of Partnership, (2nd. Ed.) page 358.
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new and interesting questions not yet settled by the
authorities." 54
In conclusion the opinion is ventured that the desirable result of preserving the priorities of firm creditors
would have been more securely attained in this state by
codifying the entity theory, thus following a path blazed
by Williams, J., twenty-five years before the passage of
the Act. 85
A. J.WHITE HUTTON.

54
55 Supra.

page 132.
CIarke v R. R. Co., 136 Pa. 413 (1890). The late James Barr
Ames, Deam of Iarvard Law School, had prepared a draft of a Uniform Act based on the entity theory. The work of this eminent
authority was subsequently rejected by the Committee. See also
article by Judson A. Crane, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 788.
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MOOT COURT
MITCHELL'S ESTATE
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sarah Mitchell, an invalid, engaged Jane Kop, the plaintiff,
as nurse, promising to pay her five dollars a week, and to devise
to her a house worth $2000.00, and subsequently made a will containing the devise. Later however Mrs. Mitchell conveyed the
house in question to X, without the knowledge of the plaintiff.
Mrs. Kop remained in this employment for the period of ten
years, until the death of her employer, and seeks to recover from
the estate of the decedent, the present value of the house which was
to have been devised to her, basing her claim upon the above agreement with Mrs. Mitchell.
Ridgway, for Plaintiff.
Snyder, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE LOWER COURT
PERRY, J:-The question arises as to whether the plaintiff may recover upon this alleged contract. To us there appears
an insuperable difficulty in the 'way of the plaintiff, in that she
seeks to recover upon the strength of a contract which she, in
the trial, has failed to establish. The agreement alleged in the
pleading, and upon which Mrs. Kop bases her recovery, is an oral
contract to devise certain realty, in the nature of a contract to
convey, and invalid and unenforceable because within the
provisions of the Statute of Frauds dealing with such contracts. It is settled law in Pennsylvania that an oral contract
to devise land to the promissee falls within the terms of the
Statute and will not form the foundation, of an action based,
thereon. Tieman's Appeal, 23 Dist. Ct. 607; Fuller v Fuller, 219
Pa. 163.
Nor is the plaintiff's full performance of all outstanding
obligations sufficient to remove this obstacle which the legislature
has seen fit to impose upon such agreements; the weight of
authority seems settled, that where the performance of the services
under a contract to devise realty in consideration thereof, are of
such a nature as to be capable of an approximately accurate estimate, and their value liquidated into money, so that the promissee
may be made substantially whole, there is not a sufficient part
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performance to satisfy the statute. See the cases cited in 15
Lawyers Reports Annotated (New Series) at page 466.
Nor do we consider that the will made subsequently to the
agreement and containing a devise, to be sufficient memo of the
transaction, so as to remove the contract from the terms of the
Statute. A case upon which the defendant relies and which we
consider as the basis of our present decision, is to be found in
Goehring's Estate, 70 Sup. 340. In that case Mrs. Goeh
ring, an invalid, employed Mrs. Carey as nurse and housekeeper
paying her five dollars a month, boarding her and her child.
Mrs. Carey complained that the salary given her was inadequate
and refused to continue the employment until she should be paid
more. Mrs. Goehring then promised to leave her a house, if she
would stay, subsequently drawing up a will containing the devise
to her. Later however, she sold the house to another for $1100.00,
and Mrs. Carey's representative brings an action against the estate of Mrs. Goehring for that amount. It was decided that the
situation presented a breach of a parol agreement to convey land,
and the plaintiff was not allowed to recover the present value of
the house.
Although it is true that the very early cases in Pennsylvania
decided the measure of damages in such a case as this, to be the
value of the property promised to be devised, yet these decisions
were overruled in the case of Hertzog v Hertzog, 34 Pa. 418, and
the present doctrine, as we so interpret it, allows a plaintiff suing,
to recover the value of services rendered in consideration of a
contract to devise property, invalid because of the statute of
frauds, only the reasonable value of the services rendered and not
the value of the property, without reference to, and disconnected
with, the express contract. The action is on the implied promise,
imposed by law upon the defendent and not upon any express
contract; any evidence of the value of the land, stipulated in the
agreement to be devised being inadmissable. Therefor the amount to be recovered in this action, is not the present value of
the house as stated in the agreement, but rather the reasonable,
or the market value of the services rendered by the plaintiff after
deducting the amount which she may have already received.
Hertzog v Hertzog, 34 Pa. 418; Bender v Bender, 37 Pa. 419;
Ewing v Thompson, 66 Pa. 383; Krauss v Rohner, 172 Pa. 481;
Goehring's Estate, 70 Sup. 340. See also the cases cited in 37 L R
A (n. s.) 641.
And our conclusion is therefor, that altho the plaintiff's
claim is not without substantial merit, yet she is entitled to recover only upon her strict legal standing, and only to the extent
of the market value of her services which she has performed.
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She seeks in this action to recover on a contract which she is forbidden by the statute to assert, and we would advise her to
bring an action, not on the contract as in this case, but rather an
action to recover the value of services rendered. We must therefor
decide that the action be dismissed, the costs to be borne by the
plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
But little need be added to the lucid opinion of the learned
court below.
The promise to devise the house was oral. Nothing occurred
to exempt it from the operation of the statute of frauds. Neither
specific execution nor recovery of damages equal to the value
of the house can be permitted.
For the services rendered, their fair value can be recovered,
but in estimating their value, no use can be made of the value
of the house. The fact that the house is now worth $3000 is irrelevant.
Mrs. Kop might have changed the character of her demand.
By the contract she was to get five dollars per week and a house
worth $2000. This might be deemed an estimate by Mrs. Mitchell,
of the value of the services, i. e., five dollars per week for the
weeks of the service plus $2000. She has not made such claim,
and the decision of the learned court below must be affirmed.
Appeal dismissed.

COLLINS v RAILROAD COMPANY
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Collins, procured from the defendant a ticket
for a ride between the points A and B. As soon as he took his
seat at A, the conductor lifted his ticket. Later not recognizing
him or forgetting the receipt of the ticket, the conductor demanded a ticket. Collins refused to offer any ticket declaring that he
had delivered it to the conductor. This person stopped the train
and ejected Collins. This is an action of trespass.
Krick, for Plaintiff.
Delesantro, for Defendant.
OPINION OF LOWER COURT
CAROTHERS, J.-A railroad is a public service company.
It is the recipient of exclusive franchises; to it is granted the
power of eminent domain, the use of the streets and high-ways
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and other powers and rights of a public nature. Since such
powers and rights can only be granted or delegated for the benefit of the public, the railroad company as a public service company
or common carrier is under a duty to serve the public. In the
performance of that duty a railroad company may provide reasonable rules and regulations to be complied with by those who seek
it's service. There is no question but that it is a reasonable regulation which requires a patron of the railroad to make payment in
advance of the service or that he shall secure a ticket before
entering one of the company's passenger trains. If a patron
enters a passenger train having complied with all the rules and
regulations and conducts himself in a decent and orderly manner
he is entitled to, and the company is under a duty to give him, the
service for which he has contracted.
The case at bar is clearly distinguishable from those in which
the conductor has expelled a passenger who presents an improper
ticket due either to the fault of the agent from whom he purchased
the ticket or of a conductor on a previous train, or of himself. In the
ease at bar the whole mistake was made by the conductor whose
act of expelling the plaintiff was made the basis of the latter's
alleged right of action. Therefore, the plaintiff's right to recover
rests solely upon the determination of the question as to whether
a passenger who heeds all rules and regulations, may recover
damages from a railroad company whose conductor takes from
him a proper ticket and later demands from him repayment of
the fare and ejects the passenger upon refusal to pay a second
time.
It is conceded that the conductor acted within the scope of
his authority. 87 N. Y. 25.
The majority rule is that a passenger who has paid his fare,
either with cash or ticket, is entitled, if called upon to pay a second
time, to stand upon his rights and refuse to pay. He is not bound
to pay a second time: Ann. Cases. 1913 B. Vol. 27. p. 1209. This
rule is applied in several eases whose facts are identical with
those of the case at bar. In 153 Pa. 236 it is held that a passenger
is entitled to recover for injury to feelings and humiliation suffered by trespass. In 153 Ala. 286 and a case exactly on point, it
was held that the passenger was under no obligation to pay her
fare a second time even when a fellow passenger offered to pay
it for her, and the fact that she refused said fellow passenger's
assistance does not lessen the damages.
It was suggested by counsel for the defendant that the plaintiff
should have paid his fare to his destination and brought an action
against the railroad afterward. It seems that it would be just
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as reasonable to require the company to carry him to his destination without the fare and afterwards, bring an action against him
for it. No man is bound to suffer even a trifling extortion. We
are not partial to a rule requiring a person to submit to extortion
for the purpose of relieving the extortioner from the natural consequences of his own acts.
On principle therefore, it seems to us that the majority rule
best accords with justice and courteous and efficient performance
of the duties resting upon a public service company. For application of the rule we are supported by precedent in our own Commonwealth and in view of the overwhelming weight of authority
disclosed by our own research and by the admirable brief of
plaintiff's counsel, we must find judgment for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
It is the duty of a passenger on a railroad, to produce to the
conductor, a ticket showing the payment of the fare, or to pay the
fare. In this case the duty was performed by the plaintiff, who
when requested delivered his ticket to the conductor. He thus
had a right not to be put off of the train, until he had reached
his destination.
Did anything later happen to deprive him of this right? The
conductor apparently forgot that he had received the ticket, and
demanded another, and the plaintiff refused to offer another. Did
that refusal impair his right to be further carried by the train?
]Tow could it? For his transportation he had fully paid, and he
had delivered to the conductor, the appointed evidence of the payment, i. e. the ticket. The railroad company could properly demand
no more.
Explanation by the passenger, to the forgetful conductor was
unnecessary. It was for the conductor to remember. The railroad
company took the risk of his having capacity to remember. We
think that, had the plaintiff refused any statement, his ejection
would have been improper. Richards v Penna. R. R. Co., 70 supra.
257.
But, the plaintiff attempted to remind the conductor that he
had delivered the ticket to the latter. That he did not succeed
was not the result of his nqglect, but of the imperfection of the
memory of the conductor.
Falsely assuming that the plaintiff had not delivered a ticket,
the conductor ejected him from the train. So to eject was a part
of the ordinary duty of the conductor, when a person was on the
train who did not give proof of having paid his fare. For an expulsion from the train, when the facts did not warrant it, the conductor and the corporation are responsible. 70 Pa. 257, supra;
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Perry v Passengers R'way. 153 Pa. 236; Light v Railway Co., 4
super. 427.
The learned court below has properly allowed a recovery.
Affirmed.
RUMMEL V STOKES
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 1,1919, Stokes drew a check for $300, payable
to the order of Simpson. Simpson endorsed it to Rummel, who
retained it until August 1, 1920, when he sued Stokes on it, never
having made an attempt to obtain payment from the bank on
which it was drawn.
At the trial, Rummel proved the signature of Stokes, the
delivery to Simpson and Simpson's indorsement. He offered no
explanation of the long delay in presenting it to the bank nor
did he show why he resorted to a suit instead of the bank for
payment. He was allowed to recover. Defendant Appeals.
McCready for Appellee.
Peelor, for Appellant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
DAVIS, J:-There are two questions for consideration of the
court in the case at hand. (1) Does the failure of a plaintiff,
holder of a check, to explain the reason for the long delay and
failure to present same to the drawee bank for payment, preclude
the said plaintiff from recovery in an action, by him against the
drawer, upon the check, and (2) must the plaintiff, holder of the
check, present -the same to the drawee bank for payment before
resorting to an action at law upon the check against the drawer
thereof?
The cases are not harmonious and all are not unanimous in
either affirming or rejecting -the propositions of law set forth
above.
The better rule seems to, and the decisions of this state
certainly do, sustain the decision of the court below in the case
here for further consideration.
A check is an unconditional order in writing addressed by one
person or persons to a bank or banker, signed by the person or
persons giving it, requiring the bank or banker to whom it is
addressed to pay on demand a sum certain in money, to order or
to bearer.
The drawer of a check warrants that he has sufficient funds
in the hands of -the drawee bank to pay the check and if the
check is not paid by the bank upon presentation, he will do so.
Why should the mere failure of the holder to present the check
to the drawee for payment estop him from collecting from the
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drawer directly? The liability of the drawer is primary, merely
because the holder seeks to have payment directly from the
drawer rather than from funds in the banks of the drawee is no
reason to prevent him, if he choses so to do.
It works no hardship upon the drawer because he is only
doing that which he would be forced to do had his funds in the
hands of the drawee been exhausted or the account withdrawn.
That the drawer is not discharged by the laches of the holder
in presenting it for payment, unless he can show that he has sustained some injury by the default, is decided in the cases of Exchange Bank of Wheeling v Sutton Bank, 75 Md. 577, 28 Atl. 563
and Morrison v Bailey, 5 Ohio St. 13, 64 Am. Dec. 632.
It is held in Flemming v Denny 2 Phila. 111, to an action by
a holder against the drawer of a check, it is no answer that the
check was not presented in a reasonable time, unless, during
delay the fund has been lost by failure of the banker.
In the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, Sec. 186, we find
a "Check must be presented within a reasonable time after its
issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon, to
the extent of the loss caused by delay."
By this section it is quite clear that the only ground for relieving the drawer from liability on the check, where there
has not been presentment within a reasonable time is where he,
the maker, has been occasioned loss by reason of the delay,-and
even then his exemption is only in proportion to the loss which
he has suffered.
Failure to make demand within a reasonable time, and to give
notice of non-payment, does not premptorily discharge the drawer
of a check. In case of a check the drawer is the principal debtor,
and he is not discharged by any laches of the holder in not making
due presentation thereof, or in not giving him notice of the dishonor unless he has suffered some loss or injury thereby, and
then only pro tanto. He is exonerated to the extent of his injury.
A mere partial injury will not entitle him to be exonerated from
the whole debt. Bradley v Andrews 107 Fed. 196; Industrial
Bank of Chicago v Bowes. 165 Ill. 70, 46 N. E. 10; Noble v
Doughten 72 Kan. 336, 83 Pac. 1048; Kenyon v Stanton 44 Wis. 479,
Weiand's Adm. v State Bank of Maysville 112 Ky. 310, 65 S. W.
617; Culver v Marks 122 Ind. 554, 23 N. E. 1086.
The only way in which a drawer of a check would be liable
to be injured by failure to present it within a reasonable time
is where, subsequent to its delivery and prior to its presentment,
the bank upon which it is drawn becomes insolvent. In such a case
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the drawer will be, in respect to the check, discharged to the extent
of loss he has sustained thereby. Eaton and Gilbert on Commercial Paper, Sec. 167; N. I. A. Title 111, Article 1, Sec. 186.
If a check is not presented within a reasonable time and
there is a loss due to delay, such loss falls on the holder o± the
check. If the bank fails, the holder must suffer the loss provided
the drawer had money on deposit sufficient to pay it. Gordon v
Levine, 194 Mass. 418, 80 N. E. 505; Manitoba Mortgage and Investment Co. v Weiss 18 S. D. 459, 101 N. W. 37.
Where a check was presented long after date, and payment
was refused not on account of failure but because the drawer has
closed his account, or withdrawn his funds, the drawer is still liable.
Cox v Boone, 8 W. Va. 500, 23 Am. Rep. 627.
Delay, short of the period prescribed by the statute of limitations for an action on the check or original consideration, in
presenting a check to drawee for payment does not release the
drawer from liability on the check or original consideration for
which it was given, unless he is damaged or prejudiced by such
delay. Rosenbaum v Hazard, 233 Pa. 206; Bradley v Andrews,
107 Feb. 196.
There is no presumption of loss or injury to the maker
arising from delay on the part of the holder which would render
necessary the rebuttal of such presumption by the holder but the
burden of proof is on the maker of the check, to show that loss or
injury has resulted to him through the delay by the holder in
making, presentment and giving notice.
Rosenbaum v
Hazard, 233 Pa. 206. As was said by the court in Spink and
Keyes Drug Co. v Ryan Drug Co., 72 Minnesota 179: "Loss by
reason of negligent delay; either in making presentment or in
giving notice of dishonor is a matter of defense to be pleaded and
pLoved by the draw.er instead of requiriug the holder to allege
and prove a negative as to a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the drawer."
There is not, in the case at bar, even an iuference of any loss
to the defendant maker, therefore since none is alleged or proven,
and a holder may neglect to present a check to the drawee for
payment and demand payment from the maker instead, at any
time until an action on the check has been rendered impossible
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The question is, whether the delay of eleven months in presenting the check, precluded a suit upon the check by its holder.
The court below has properly decided that it did not. The drawer
of the check tacitly says that he has the money in the bank
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because barred by the statute of limitations, the decree of the
court below is affirmed and the Appeal dissmissed.
with which to pay it, and that he will not withdraw that money
until the holder of the check has had the opportunity to obtain
payment of it from the bank. But, by receiving a check, one
does not agree to look to no other source of payment than the
bank on which it is drawn. The drawer may let this money remain in the bank for the purpose of paying the check, and if an
undue time passes without presenting it, and if the bank becomes
partially or wholely insolvent, the holder of the check will have
to indemnify the drawer to the amount of the check, or as much
of it as shall be lost.
The burden of showing insolvency and loss is on the maker
of the check. They are not presumed. Rosenbaum v Hazard, 233
Pa. 206.
The opinion of the learned court below sufficiently supports
its disposition of the case.
The judgment is affirmed.

